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The simplest quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is based on the 
transmission of two nonorthogonal states [1]. Bennett’s original scheme is a 
multi-photon interferometric scheme using two nonorthogonal low-intensity coherent 
states, though peoples usually adopt the scheme that employing the single-photon 
polarization as a carrier of quantum signals [2, 3]. Up to now, several experiments of 
interferometric scheme have been done, but the bright reference pulses of the original 
scheme are omitted, this simplification makes the scheme more insecure.  
Generally speaking, there are three types of attacks on a secure communication: 
1) attack on the algorithm; 2) attack on the protocol; 3) attack on the system. So far 
thorough analysis of the security of quantum cryptography scheme usually related 
with the first or the second type of attacks[4,5]. Here we present another kind of 
eavesdropping strategy: two-point eavesdropping strategy, to attack the two 
nonorthogonal state QKD system. It is easy to find that the two almost unchangeable 
parameters, the group velocity of light pulse in fiber and the loss of fiber, render the 
two nonorthogonal state protocol (single-photon type) over a fiber-optic channel 
insecure if only the distance between Alice and Bob is longer than a definite length.  
Consider that there are two eavesdroppers: Eve1 and Eve2. They can 
communicate with each other through a classical channel of signal velocity c . Eve1 
is at the point near Alice’s security domain, and Eve2 is at the point near Bob’s 
security domain. Eve1 intercepts the quantum channel and measures every quantum 
signal. The serious weakness of two-nonorthogonal protocol is that Eve has a 
non-zero probability of measuring the state of quantum signals exactly. Suppose the 
carrier particle , transmitted by Alice in one of the two states 1Ψ  and 2Ψ , is 
measured by Bob in one of the two orthonormal bases }{ 11 ΨΨ ， and }{ 22 ΨΨ ， , 
chosen at random. Suppose ϕ2212221 sin=ΨΨ=ΨΨ , then Eve1’s probability 
of successful measurements is ϕ2sin
2
1 . Eves’ two-point strategy is rather simple: 
Eve1 sends a sequence consists of 0, 1, and 2 to Eve2 via the classical channel, where 
1 and 2 represent that her measurements are successful in those positions of time: 1 
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represents the corresponding quantum signal is definitely in the state 1Ψ  , and 2 
represents the corresponding quantum signal is definitely in the state 2Ψ . If only 
the system is sufficiently long, Eve1 and Eve2 can choose their positions on the 
channel that satisfy that the loss of the fiber between them is lager than the probability 
of Eve1’s inconclusive outcomes. For example, let us investigate the simplified 
single-photon B92 protocol. Suppose Eve1’s single-photon detector is an ideal one. 
The probability of Eve1’s inconclusive outcomes is 
4
3 ,  that corresponding a loss of 
6dB , then the length of fiber between Eve1 and Eve2 should be about 30 kilometers.  
Eve2’s task is resenting quantum signals 1Ψ  and 2Ψ  in accordance with the 
sequence coming from Eve1. Suppose that all of them, include Alice, Bob, and Eves, 
use ideal single-photon sources and detectors, it is obvious that Alice and Bob cannot 
find the two-point attack at all. If we take account of the practical parameters of the 
sources and detectors, the distance between the two Eves should be longer than that 
deduced from the ideal case. Besides, Eve2 must use a source of sub-Poissonian 
statistics if Bob counts the number of photons in every pulse. 
The original multi-photon realization of the two nonorthogonal states protocol [1] 
is designed so ingenious that it can resist not only the coherent amplification attack 
but also the two-point attack. It is especially interesting that this multi-photon 
protocol, even realized with weak pulse source, is still rather secure against the beam 
splitting attack, contrast to BB84 protocol with weak pulse source. In the 
multi-photon B92 protocol, Eve can only get limited information (less than 10% if 
each dim signal pulse after Eve1’s interferometer contains 0.1 photon averagely) of 
the raw key regardless of the length of the system, and Alice and Bob can get secure 
key after privacy amplification. It is clear that the original Bennett 92 protocol is the 
most secure protocol for fiber-optic QKD system today in the communication 
wavelength since there is still no stable single-photon source in this wavelength now. 
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